The debate over the rise of investment funds in European football returns to the spotlight following the analysis published by ‘Sportsin.biz’, which contrasts with what happens on the pitch, where the strength of teams such as Real Madrid, FC Barcelona and Bayern Munich is evident, all of them operating under a different model without external capital (Bayern only 10%). Who really runs football today?

While many European clubs have opened the door to investors, others continue under traditional structures: member ownership in the case of Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, and majority control by the association in Bayern. And yet, they continue to compete -and win- at the highest level.

The case of Real Madrid is particularly significant. The club does not just compete, it dominates. Over the last decade, it has built a hegemony in Europe that is difficult to match, winning six Champions League titles (2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2022 and 2024) against rivals with far more aggressive financial structures (Manchester City has only won one (2023), Paris Saint-Germain has one (2025) and Chelsea FC has won two (2012 and 2021), with inconsistency being a defining trait).

The shift that makes no sense

In this context, it is surprising that the current Real Madrid president, Florentino Pérez, is insisting on exploring the conversion of the club into a Sports Public Limited Company. A decision that, beyond economics, affects the very essence of the club. What is the need? Real Madrid wins. It wins titles, it wins matches, it wins prestige. And it does so without relying on investment funds or structures outside its members. Why alter a model that works?

For money? According to the Deloitte Football Money League 2026, Real Madrid leads world football in revenue with €1.161 billion, followed by FC Barcelona with €974.8 million and Bayern Munich with €860.6 million. These three giants protect this model over the rest, which generate less: Paris Saint-Germain with €837 million; followed by Liverpool FC (€836.1 million), Manchester City (€829.3 million), Arsenal FC (€821.7 million) and Manchester United (€793.1 million).

The transformation into a PLC would inevitably open the door to investors whose main objective is not sporting success, but financial return. And that is where the risk lies. When control shifts towards capital, the focus changes: from trophies to balance sheets, from sporting success to profitability. And although Florentino Pérez may only want to open the door to 10% external capital -as Bayern has done- it would still mean opening that door, making it easier in the future to increase that percentage. And yet, looking at the numbers, the same question arises again… what is the need?

Cases of failure

Recent history is full of examples that invite reflection. Clubs with strong investor backing that, despite their financial power, have failed to establish themselves sportingly. Manchester United has spent years away from the European elite despite its enormous spending capacity. Chelsea FC, after successive ownership changes, has entered a spiral of sporting instability that is difficult to justify given its investment.

Even more striking are cases where external capital has not only failed to improve performance, but has worsened it. Valencia CF, under investor management, has gone from competing in Europe to fighting to avoid relegation. Everton FC, despite heavy financial injections, lives in a constant sporting crisis. Newcastle has not been able to break into the elite despite its strong capital backing…

The core of the debate also invites reflection on the future of football and sport in general. Whether the right model is the best possible management of a sports club or whether, inevitably, it must be commercialised. This question extends to any other sport. While some seek profitability, others keep winning (while being profitable).