The proposed Berraf–Blanco presidential rotation faces a demanding legal hurdle: 155 votes, strict amendment deadlines and a Constitution that does not provide for automatic succession.
The agreement between Mustapha Berraf and Alejandro Blanco to share the ANOC presidency over the 2026–2030 term may have offered a political solution to a potentially divisive election. But turning that understanding into a workable institutional arrangement is another matter.
The proposed formula is straightforward: Berraf would serve as President from 2026 to 2028, with Blanco taking over for the remaining two years.
The difficulty is that ANOC’s current Constitution does not provide for such an arrangement.
A closer examination of its provisions raises significant questions about how the agreement could be implemented, whether a constitutional amendment would be necessary and, perhaps most importantly, whether the required support could be secured.
The 155-vote hurdle
Article 21.1(d) of the ANOC Constitution sets a particularly demanding threshold for constitutional amendments.
Any amendment must receive the affirmative votes of at least three quarters of ANOC’s total membership.
With 206 National Olympic Committees, that means a minimum of 155 affirmative votes.
The distinction matters. The requirement is not 75% of those present at the General Assembly, nor 75% of the votes cast. It is 75% of the entire membership.
Even if only 180 NOCs participated, the amendment would still require 155 votes in favour — more than 86% of those attending.
Abstentions and absences would not lower the threshold.
Securing such a majority would require exceptionally broad agreement among the NOCs. Political support for the two candidates, however substantial, would not automatically translate into support for changing the Constitution.
What happens if the President resigns?
The second obstacle lies in the Constitution’s provisions governing presidential terms and succession.
Articles 13.3 and 13.4 establish the framework for the election of the President and the four-year presidential mandate.
Article 13.9 allows an elected President to resign through written notification to the Executive Council.
But resignation does not permit the outgoing President to appoint a successor.
Article 13.10 provides that, in the event of a presidential vacancy, the Senior Vice-President assumes the presidency temporarily until the next Ordinary General Assembly, when a new President must be elected for the remainder of the term.
This has direct implications for the proposed 2+2 formula.
If Berraf were elected in December 2026 and resigned two years later, Blanco would not automatically become President simply because the two had reached a political agreement.
The constitutional succession procedure would take effect. The Senior Vice-President would assume the presidency temporarily, and a new election would follow.
Blanco could potentially stand in that election, subject to the applicable eligibility and nomination rules. But his election could not be guaranteed in advance.
In other words, a political commitment to resign after two years is not the same as a legally enforceable transfer of the presidency.
The distinction goes to the heart of the proposed agreement.
The deadline problem
Even if the two candidates and their supporters agreed that a constitutional amendment was the appropriate solution, Article 21 presents another difficulty.
The Constitution establishes specific procedures and deadlines for proposing amendments.
Under Article 21.1(a), amendments proposed by the Executive Council must be circulated to NOCs at least 90 days before an Ordinary General Assembly.
Article 21.1(b) also provides a 60-day deadline for additional or alternative proposals submitted by NOCs.
The amendment documentation must then be included with the General Assembly agenda at least 30 days before the meeting.
These requirements are not simply administrative formalities. They give member NOCs time to examine proposed changes before deciding whether to support them.
The Berraf–Blanco arrangement was publicly reported on 24 September 2026, after the 90-day deadline for Executive Council amendments ahead of the December General Assembly had already passed.
That timing does not establish that no relevant proposal was submitted earlier. But it raises an obvious question.
Was a constitutional amendment enabling the proposed presidential rotation formally submitted and circulated within the required deadlines?
No such proposal has been publicly verified in the material examined for this analysis.
If none was submitted through the prescribed procedure, introducing a new constitutional mechanism at the December General Assembly would face an additional procedural obstacle.
Article 21 also restricts the introduction of new amendments from the floor of the General Assembly, limiting the possibility of resolving the issue through an improvised last-minute proposal.
Can the agreement work without changing the Constitution?
There is an important distinction between a political understanding and a constitutional mechanism.
Berraf and Blanco may agree on a joint programme, cooperate during the presidential term or reach an understanding about a future resignation.
None of those arrangements necessarily requires the creation of a new constitutional office or an automatic succession procedure.
But guaranteeing that one candidate will hand the presidency to the other after two years is a different proposition.
Under the existing provisions, a resignation would trigger the vacancy procedure and a subsequent election, not an automatic transfer of office.
If the intention is to establish a binding presidential rotation, a formal constitutional amendment appears to be the necessary route.
That would require a properly submitted proposal, compliance with Article 21’s deadlines and the support of at least 155 NOCs.
An alternative based on resignation and a new election might operate within the existing framework, but it would leave the outcome of that future election open.
The two mechanisms cannot be treated as equivalent.
A political agreement awaiting a constitutional solution
The proposed 2+2 arrangement has already been presented publicly as a framework for cooperation between the two presidential candidates.
Its political significance is clear. Its constitutional implementation is not.
There are now several questions that require answers.
Has a formal amendment been prepared? Was it submitted within the required timetable? Does the agreement envisage automatic succession, or merely a resignation followed by another election? And if constitutional change is necessary, can the proposal attract the affirmative votes of 155 National Olympic Committees?
These are not questions about the intentions of either candidate. They concern the rules under which ANOC elects its leadership and the authority of its General Assembly.
The Constitution provides a clear framework for presidential elections, resignations and vacancies. What it does not currently provide is a guaranteed two-year rotation between two presidential candidates.
That is the central difficulty facing the Berraf–Blanco agreement.
A political compromise may bring two candidates together. But it cannot, by itself, change the Constitution or predetermine a future election.
For the proposed 2+2 arrangement to become more than a political understanding, its supporters must demonstrate precisely how it can operate within ANOC’s constitutional framework — or secure the substantial majority required to change that framework.
Until then, the agreement remains politically significant, but its promised presidential succession remains constitutionally unresolved.
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