THE IN Governance Series — Episode 5
The Olympic system is not simply changing its programme. It is changing where power sits.
For months, much of the debate around Brisbane 2032 has concentrated on sports: which will remain, which disciplines could disappear, which new ones may enter and how large the final programme will eventually become. These are important questions, but after the changes examined throughout this series, they are no longer the biggest one. Put all the reforms together — the weakening of the old assumption of permanent Olympic status, the move towards evaluating disciplines rather than protecting entire sports, greater programme flexibility for the host, the evolving qualification architecture and a Games model increasingly shaped around cost, existing infrastructure and local relevance — and a different picture begins to emerge. Individually, these changes can be presented as modernisation. Together, they amount to a redistribution of power inside the Olympic Movement.
For decades, the Olympic architecture was relatively easy to understand. International Federations governed their sports, developed their disciplines, controlled qualification systems and operated with a reasonable expectation that an established Olympic sport would remain part of the Games. Host cities largely organised what the Olympic programme required, while the IOC sat at the centre of the system but relied heavily on the IFs to deliver the sporting product. That architecture has not disappeared, but the balance inside it is changing. International Federations remain indispensable because they possess the technical expertise, regulate their sports, organise international competition and ultimately provide the athletes without whom there are no Olympic Games. What is becoming less secure is not their existence, but their position within the Olympic programme.
The decision to evaluate disciplines rather than simply treating an entire sport as one indivisible Olympic unit is particularly significant. Once evaluation moves below federation level, the internal politics of Olympic survival also change. An International Federation may remain globally successful while discovering that not every discipline under its authority has the same Olympic future. Federations will therefore increasingly have to demonstrate not only why their sport belongs in the Games, but why individual parts of that sport justify their place against competing disciplines, athlete quotas, venue costs and programme limits. The question gradually moves from “Is our sport Olympic?” to “Which part of our sport is valuable enough to remain Olympic?”
For the IOC, this creates considerably more flexibility. It becomes possible to shape the Games according to audience relevance, participation, gender balance, cost, venue requirements and the strategic character of each edition without necessarily taking the politically much larger decision of removing an entire International Federation from the Olympic programme. For the federations, the same flexibility creates opportunity and uncertainty at the same time. A modern, accessible and attractive discipline may strengthen its Olympic position, while another discipline within the same federation may become increasingly difficult to justify. Historical presence still matters, but it can no longer be assumed to provide permanent protection.
The host is also gaining influence, although not sovereignty. The Olympic model increasingly allows organising committees and governments to construct Games around the infrastructure and geography they already possess rather than forcing cities to reproduce a universal Olympic template. Brisbane is particularly important because it is being developed within precisely this philosophy: greater use of existing facilities, regional distribution, cost control and a closer relationship between the Olympic programme and what the host can realistically deliver. That gives the host a stronger voice in deciding what makes operational and economic sense, but it does not give it unlimited authority.
The current debate around the proposed Fitzroy River venue for rowing and canoe sprint provides a useful illustration. A government can decide that a venue fits its infrastructure and regional-development strategy, and an Organising Committee can build its plans around that decision. Yet the relevant International Federation retains responsibility for determining whether the field of play satisfies the technical, competitive and safety requirements of its sport. The host can therefore say, “This is what we can sustainably deliver,” while the federation can answer, “This is what our sport requires.” Somewhere between those positions sits the IOC. The more flexible the Games become, the more frequently someone may have to arbitrate between legitimate but competing interests.
This is one of the paradoxes of the emerging model. Greater flexibility can look like decentralisation because hosts have more choices and federations are expected to adapt to different Games environments. In practice, however, flexibility can create a stronger need for central authority. When the programme is no longer protected by permanence, venues are no longer predetermined by tradition and multiple stakeholders have competing priorities, somebody must ultimately decide which interests prevail.
Qualification adds another dimension to this shift. International Federations have traditionally controlled the pathways through which athletes reach the Olympic Games and they continue to provide the essential technical framework for qualification. Yet the IOC is increasingly building an Olympic-branded qualification architecture of its own. The Olympic Qualification Series has now developed into the broader Olympic Q-Series for LA28, bringing multiple disciplines together under a recognisably Olympic platform. This may appear primarily to be an event or marketing innovation, but qualification is one of the most important functions in international sport because it controls access to the Olympic stage. As common Olympic qualification platforms develop, the IOC’s relationship becomes more direct not only with federations but also with athletes, host cities, broadcasters and audiences.
The same evolution can be seen in the IOC’s relationship with athletes. The Fit for the Future strategy places athletes explicitly at the centre of the organisation’s direction towards 2032 and introduces direct grants for Olympic athletes. Historically, an athlete’s route into the Olympic system ran overwhelmingly through national federations, International Federations and National Olympic Committees. Those institutions remain fundamental, but direct athlete support, Olympic qualification platforms and increasingly centralised athlete programmes shorten the institutional distance between the IOC and the competitors themselves. No intermediary disappears, but the relationships inside the system are being rearranged.
When these developments are viewed together, the emerging power structure becomes easier to see. The IOC gains strategic flexibility: it can shape the programme more precisely, influence the qualification environment more directly, negotiate Games around host realities and develop a closer relationship with athletes. Hosts gain greater freedom to propose Games that fit their infrastructure, geography and market rather than simply reproducing what previous hosts built. Athletes gain a more direct place within Olympic programmes and support structures. International Federations remain essential, but their Olympic security becomes increasingly conditional, while individual disciplines begin to compete for relevance within what is effectively becoming an Olympic marketplace.
This may be the deepest transformation of all. The traditional Olympic system was largely organised around institutions and the positions they had accumulated over decades. The emerging system is increasingly organised around value: what a discipline contributes to the Games, what athletes need, what a host can deliver, what audiences want to watch and what the IOC believes is necessary to keep the Olympic product relevant. There are powerful arguments in favour of such a model. A programme capable of adapting can remain contemporary; a Games built around existing infrastructure is easier to defend economically; qualification presented through coherent Olympic platforms may be more understandable and commercially attractive; and no sport should expect history alone to guarantee its place forever.
But flexibility has a governance consequence. The more permanent guarantees disappear, the more important the institution making the choices becomes. That is the central paradox running through the reforms examined in this series. The emerging Olympic system appears more flexible, collaborative and decentralised because hosts have greater influence, disciplines can move in and out of the programme and federations are required to adapt. Yet every additional choice creates another decision between competing interests, and the ultimate framework within which those decisions are made remains controlled by the IOC.
The IOC determines the architecture of the Olympic programme and ultimately approves what enters the Games. Its role in qualification is becoming more visible, its relationship with athletes more direct and its position between hosts and International Federations increasingly important whenever their priorities diverge. This does not mean that the IFs, NOCs or hosts are losing all power. The more accurate conclusion is that their power is becoming more conditional and interconnected, while the IOC’s position as the institution capable of balancing those interests becomes stronger.
For International Federations, the message towards Brisbane 2032 is therefore uncomfortable but clear. Their future Olympic influence will depend less on defending historical entitlement and more on demonstrating why their disciplines remain indispensable to the Games. For hosts, greater flexibility brings greater influence but also responsibility for proving that their choices can meet international sporting standards. For athletes, the emerging architecture may provide a more direct relationship with the Olympic system. And for the IOC, greater authority inevitably brings greater accountability for how those choices are made.
Brisbane 2032 will eventually tell us which sports and disciplines have survived this transition, which have adapted and which new ones have found their way into the Olympic programme. But that may not be its most important institutional legacy. By the time the programme is settled, the venues are confirmed and the qualification pathways are established, Brisbane may have revealed something much more fundamental about the Olympic Movement: not simply what the Games of the future will look like, but where authority within them now resides.
The question is no longer only who gets into the Olympic Games. It is who now holds the power to decide.
